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Counterfactual thinking is thinking about a past that did not happen. This is often the
case in “if only. . . ” situations, where we wish something had or had not happened. To
make a choice in a moral decision-making situation is particularly hard and, therefore, may
be often associated with the imagination of a different outcome. The main aim of the
present study is to investigate counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning.
We used a modified version of Greene’s moral dilemmas test, studying both the time
needed to provide a counterfactual in the first and third person and the type of given
response (in context-out of context) in a sample of 90 healthy subjects. We found a longer
response time for personal vs. impersonal moral dilemmas. This effect was enhanced in
the first person perspective, while in the elderly there was an overall slowing of response
time. Out of context/omissive responses were more frequent in the case of personal
moral dilemmas presented in the first person version, with females showing a marked
increase in this kind of response. These findings suggest that gender and perspective have
a critical role in counterfactual thinking in the context of moral reasoning, and may have
implications for the understanding of gender-related inclinations as well as differences in
moral judgment.
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INTRODUCTION
While people ponder about the choices they have taken, the
thought “if only. . . ,” often comes to their mind. We frequently
construct counterfactual alternatives about what might have
been. Such counterfactual thinking is pervasive in everyday life,
and it has been examined by philosophers and psychologists
(Stalnaker, 1968; Kahneman et al., 1982; Roese, 1997; Byrne and
Tasso, 1999; Roese and Olson, 2014). Counterfactual thinking
helps people to learn from experience and can influence different
cognitive activities such as deduction, decision making, prob-
ability calculation and problem solving (Byrne, 2002; Coricelli
et al., 2007; Epstude and Roese, 2008). Moreover, counterfac-
tual thinking is associated with complex emotions, such as guilt,
regret or blame (Camille et al., 2004; Young and Koenigs, 2007).
Counterfactual reasoning may play an important role in moral
judgment, in fact investigating the link between counterfactual
thinking and moral judgment could increase our understanding
of how people tend to condemn crimes, and thus be relevant for
criminal and forensic psychology (i.e., how judges, courts and
popular jury in general tend to condemn or absolve incrimi-
nated people). The literature addressing this issue is very limited.
Research on counterfactual thinking (i.e., the construction of
mental alternatives to reality) has established that some mental
alternatives to the negative outcome of a scenario are more avail-
able than others (Byrne, 2005; Mandel et al., 2005; Roese, 2005).
For example, Girotto et al. (1991) showed that events under the
control of the protagonist, such as his/her decisions, are more
amenable to mental change than events the protagonist cannot
control. Moreover, the individual’s role - in particular, whether
the individual is an “actor” (i.e., directly involved) or a “reader”
(i.e., an observer)- can strongly affect counterfactual thinking,
and this could be due to different motivational goals between
actors and readers (Elster, 1999; Gilbert et al., 2004). According
to Girotto et al. (2007) there is another reason to posit differ-
ences between actors’ and readers’ counterfactual thoughts, i.e.,
the differential availability of information. Unlike readers, who
only know the final outcome, the actors can easily retrieve from
memory many elements of the problem-solving phase of the
event. These elements concern salient parts of the actor’s experi-
ence, and will determine the construction of an alternative choice.
Nadelhoffer and Feltz (2008) conducted a behavioral study using
a version of “trolley problem” (Thomson, 1976). The dilemma
was presented either in the first person (actor) or in the third per-
son (observer). In the actor condition, 65% of the participants
found the action (throwing the switch) to be permissible, whereas
in the observer condition 90% of the participants found the
action as morally acceptable. Furthermore, Avram et al. (2014)
demonstrated that the first or third person perspective in moral
cognition involves distinct neural processes. While common acti-
vation was present in the anterior medial prefrontal cortex, the
third person perspective elicited additional activations in hip-
pocampus and visual cortex. The findings of these studies suggest
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that, in moral judgment, different psychological processes and
brain networks are involved by the two perspectives.
In the same vein, different brain areas are also involved in
personal and impersonal moral dilemmas. In fact, Greene et al.
(2001) investigated the brain networks implicated in personal
and impersonal moral dilemmas. They considered a moral vio-
lation to be personal if it meets the following three criteria: it
must be likely to cause serious bodily harm; this harmmust befall
a particular person or set of persons; the harm must not result
from the deflection of an existing threat onto a different party.
Dilemmas that fail to meet these three criteria were classified
as impersonal. Using fMRI, they reported a significant increase
of cerebral activity when the subjects considered personal moral
dilemmas, particularly in brain networks associated with emotion
and social cognition (i.e., medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cin-
gulate, superior temporal sulcus/temporo-parietal junction). In
the case of impersonal moral dilemmas, increase in brain activ-
ity involved only neural networks subserving working memory
and cognitive processes (i.e., dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, right
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC), bilateral inferior parietal
lobule). Moreover, Greene et al. (2004) showed that when sub-
jects provide utilitarian responses in personal moral dilemma, in
which utilitarian consequences of choices (i.e., maximize the gain,
as to save 5 people instead 1) are in conflict with deontological
rules (avoiding to harm others), the right DLPFC (involved in
planning and reasoning) is activated, highlighting the influence
of cognitive processes on utilitarian choices. While intuitively
appealing, the personal/impersonal distinction has been criticized
on several grounds. It is poorly generalizable to other classes of
moral dilemmas (McGuire et al., 2009) and it cannot explain the
variability found in response to the trolley problems (Mikhail,
2007). In addition, personal moral dilemmas use more emo-
tive language and references to family members or friends than
impersonal dilemmas, there is no control for cognitive process-
ing requirements across conditions, and questioning whether the
chosen actions were appropriate may be ambiguous (Schaich
Borg et al., 2006).
The main aim of the present study is to investigate counter-
factual thinking under the condition of moral reasoning, two
phenomena intimately interrelated. Few studies investigated the
link andmutual influence between these two processes; moreover,
we know little about the role and influence of perspective, age and
gender in this specific field.
As highlighted by Branscombe et al. (1996), moral judgment
is strongly influenced by participants’ focus in their counterfac-
tual thinking. They showed that focusing on the assaillant’s or
the victim’s behavior changes significantly their point of view
about condemnation of the crime. Moreover, looking at the influ-
ence of moral judgment on counterfactual thinking, it was found
that people tended to produce more counterfactual thinking for
“immoral” than for neutral dilemmas (N’gbala and Branscombe,
1997). In fact, when individuals have to cope with a moral
dilemma, they tend to focus on the agent who performed the
action and are much more inclined to look at alternative actions
that the agent could have performed. Moreover, counterfactu-
als reveal contradictions in our belief systems and highlight
double standards in our moral judgments, being also necessary
to evaluate the moral benefits of real world outcomes (Lebow,
2007). Finally, as shown by several studies, counterfactuals are
useful in planning sub-goals and learning from experiences,
thus acting as a guide in moral judgment (Epstude and Roese,
2008).
Such relationship between counterfactual thinking and moral
judgment can be modulated by some individual differences such
as age and gender. As shown previously, moral judgment presents
strong gender-related differences, both at behavioral and neuro-
biological levels (Harenski et al., 2008; Fumagalli et al., 2010b),
and such gender-related differences reflect two different theoreti-
cal approaches (Kohlberg, 1964; Gilligan, 1982). A recent study of
Fumagalli et al. (2010a) found that responses to moral personal
dilemmas differ specifically and selectively in the two genders,
showing that men tend to provide more utilitarian answers than
women, and that this peculiarity is independent of cultural factors
such as education and religion. Regarding age, there is evidence
of a developmental progression from childhood to adulthood in
countefactuals production (Rafetseder et al., 2010), and it has
been show that the ability to apply counterfactual reasoning is not
fully developed in all children before 12 years of age (Rafetseder
et al., 2013). Although such research suggests that age and gen-
der may influence moral judgment, it remains unclear how much
of this effect could be attributed to differences in counterfactual
reasoning.
Finally, counterfactual thinking is the ability to create an imag-
ined world as close as possible to the actual one, and this needs a
change in some features of the actual world (Woodward, 2011). In
this regard, Girotto et al. (2007) stated that a possible difference
between different roles is related to the way used to change the
actual world. Actors (who are directly involved in the situation)
prefer large modifications, introducing elements not present in
the real experience. When and under which circumstances peo-
ple change these antecedent features and when they do not can
be investigated by evaluating the presence or not of out of con-
text answers, i.e., those including elements not present in the real
world.
In the present study we evaluated the time needed to offer a
counterfactual thought in different conditions (Non Moral, NM;
Moral Impersonal, MI; Moral Personal, MP) and in the case of
“first person” (actor) or “third person” (reader) perspective. We
assessed the impact of individual differences in age and gender
on the time required for response. Moreover, we also assessed the
quality of answer (in context vs. out of context) and the possi-
ble effects induced by individual differences on this aspect of the
response.
MATERIALS AND METHODS
PARTICIPANTS
Ninety healthy subjects (45 females) participated in the study.
Their mean age was 46.83± 13.81 (range 20–70 years). Any neu-
rological or psychiatric history andmedication or drug intake was
ruled out by means of a questionnaire and a clinical interview.
All participants were Italian, and their mean education was at
least 8 years (14.56 ± 3.27, range 8–18 years). Each participant
was assigned to one of three age groups (Young, Adult, Elderly):
information about the three subgroups is reported in Table 1.
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Table 1 | Demographic information of the participants.
Age Education
Overall sample
(90 participants; 45 females)
46.83±13.81 14.55±3.27
Males 47.02±14.16 14.36±3.57
Females 46.64±13.61 14.56±2.97
Group 1: Young (25 < x < 39 years)
(30 participants; 15 females)
30.23±4.38 15.07±2.68
Males 30.6±5.41 15.07±3.03
Females 29.87±3.20 15.07±2.37
Group 2: Adult (40 < x < 55 years)
(30 participants; 15 females)
48.17±4.38 13.43±3.5
Males 47.4±3.96 13.33±3.99
Females 48.93±4.77 13.53±3.04
Group 3: Elderly (56 < x < 70 years)
(30 participants; 15 females)
62.1±4.36 15.17±3.39
Males 63.07±4.50 14.67±3.02
Females 61.13±4.16 15.67±3.20
All participants signed an informed consent before partici-
pating in the study, and the study protocol was conducted in
accordance with the Declaration of Helsinki.
METHODS
The main aim of the present study is to investigate the influences
of selected variables on counterfactual thinking under the con-
dition of moral judgment. To this extent, we started from the
validated moral dilemmas task proposed by Greene et al. (2001),
slightly modifying them to fit the purposes of the present exper-
iment. In the original manuscript, this task includes a total of 64
dilemmas: 20 non moral (NM) dilemmas, where there is no emo-
tional involvement in the generation of a counterfactual of the
story; 19 impersonal (MI) dilemmas, where the protagonist does
not cause or induce damages to others with his actions, but the
emotional involvement is higher than in the NM ones; 25 per-
sonal moral (MP) dilemmas where the protagonist behaves in
ways that can induce harm to others, but with good and positive
purposes (i.e., to save someone).
First, we paired the number of dilemmas proposed to the par-
ticipants (20 for each condition), trying to maintain the same
structure of those of Greene et al. (2001). More specifically, we
maintained the 20 NM dilemmas as in Greene et al, work, and
we added one MI dilemma and deleted 5 of the MP dilemmas
used in the Greene et al. study. The only MI dilemma included
in this study was developed by our own and tested in a previous
pilot study (unpublished results). Regarding MP dilemmas, we
decided to exclude those that in the original study were present
in two modified versions, in order to avoid an excessive similarity
between different dilemmas.
Since Greene’s dilemmas, in their original version, were not
suitable to generate counterfactual thinking, we modified their
final part in order to present to the participant a given situation.
Differently from Greene and colleagues’ paper, where a judgment
of appropriateness was requested (i.e., Is it appropriate for you to
push the stranger on to the tracks in order to save the five workmen?),
here each participant was asked to cope with a situation in which
a decision has already been taken, with the related consequences,
and to propose a counterfactual thought, i.e., “What could they
have done in order to avoid the given situation?” (i.e., Given
situation: Five people die. Request for a counterfactual thought:
What could you have done to avoid this?). To stress conterfac-
tual thinking, we proposed the worst scenario as the predefined
situation.
Finally, in each group of 20 dilemmas 10 were created with
a first person involvement/perspective (actor) and 10 with a
third person involvement/perspective (reader). The whole set of
dilemmas is reported in the Supplementary Material.
The time required to offer an answer was recorded, and the
response was categorized as “in context” (i.e., “I would have
pushed the very large stranger off the bridge”) or “out of context”
(i.e., “I would have asked the very large stranger to help me to lift
a big stone”). We considered the counterfactual answer to be “out
of context” if it meets two criteria: first, the answer include ele-
ments not considered in scenario; second, these elements are used
to avoid the given situation. Answers that fail to meet these two
criteria were classified as “in context.”
Coherently with Greene et al.’s results (Greene et al., 2004)
we hypothesized an increase in reaction times (RT) along the
different types of dilemmas (NM < MI < MP), as a reflection
of the conflict between utilitarian gain and deontological rules,
the latter having a strong emotional value. Moreover, accord-
ing to Girotto and colleagues’ results (Girotto et al., 2007) we
hypothesized an increase of “out of context” answers in case of
“first person” (actor) situation with respect to the involvement
as third person (reader). Finally, we assessed the effect of gender
and age.
PROCEDURE
Participants were tested in a sound-proof, temperature controlled
environment. Dilemmas were presented in a randomized order
by means of a dedicated software (Superlab 4.0 for Windows)
that allows recording RTs needed to generate a counterfactual
thought. All experimental sessions were also audio-recorded in
order to collect the response given by the participants. Each sub-
ject was positioned in front of a computer screen at a distance
of 50–60 cm. Before the start of recording session, instructions
were presented on the screen: in case of need the participant
could request more information to the experimenter. Then, the
session started with the first dilemma. Participants were invited
to read it carefully (without time limit) and only when it was
completely clear he/she pressed a button on the keyboard and
read the sentence related to the given situation. Starting from this
screen presentation the time was recorded until the participant
pressed a second time the button on the keyboard; immediately
after he/she was asked to orally generate a counterfactual thought,
that was audio recorded (see Figure 1). The provided counter-
factual thought was then categorized as “in context” Vs “out of
context” (see above).
STATISTICAL ANALYSES
Response time and type of answer were entered in a mixed
ANOVA: Gender (M, F) × Age (Young, Adults, Elderly)
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FIGURE 1 | Experimental protocol.
× Condition (NM, MI, MP dilemmas) × Perspective (1st
person, 3rd person). Because of the high number of comparisons,
Bonferroni correction was applied and significance level set at
p < 0.02 for RTs and to p < 0.01 for type of answer provided.
RESULTS
ANOVA on response times showed a statistically significant
main effect for Age [F(2, 84) = 7.89; p = 0.0007], indicating that
time needed for responding was higher in the Elderly (M =
16.89± 0.83) with respect to the other groups (Adults: M =
12.20± 0.74; Young M = 12.58± 0.91). Post-hoc comparisons
(Scheffè’ test) indicated that Elderly were significantly different
from Adult (p = 0.002) and Young (p = 0.007), while Adult and
Young participants did not differ in the time needed to provide a
counterfactual thought.
Another significant main effect was related to Condition
[F(2, 168) = 75.61; p < 0.000001]; in this case an increase in
response time was observed from NM (M = 10.59± 0.51), to
MI (M = 14.41± 0.50) and to MP (M = 16.17± 0.61): MP
dilemmas required much more time to express a counterfactual.
Post-hoc comparisons showed that NM dilemmas were signifi-
cantly different (p < 0.000001) from both MI and MP, and that
MI and MP also differed (p = 0.03).
A Condition × Age interaction was also statistically signifi-
cant [F(4, 168) = 6.44; p < 0.00008], indicating that Elderly par-
ticipants were generally slower than others, and this was true
independent of the type of dilemma taken into consideration (see
Figure 2; post-hoc: 0.01< p< 0.00006).
The interaction Condition × Perspective also reached statisti-
cal significance [F(2, 168) = 9.32; p = 0.0001], indicating that MP
dilemmas need a longer response time with respect to both NM
and MI ones, and that this effect was boosted in the 1st person
with respect to 3rd person perspective (see Figure 3).
No other statistically significant effect was found.
The ANOVA on type of answer (i.e., “out of context”
answers) showed a significant main effect for Condition
[F(2, 168) = 103.38; p < 0.000001]. More specifically, a progres-
sive increase in out of context answers was observed from NM
FIGURE 2 | Condition × Age interaction on Response time. (NM, Non
Moral; MI, Moral Impersonal; MP, Moral personal. Young: 25 < x < 39
years; Adult: 40 < x < 55 years; Elderly: 56 < x < 70 years).
FIGURE 3 | Condition × Perspective interaction on Response time.
(NM, Non Moral; MI, Moral Impersonal; MP, Moral personal).
(M = 0.01± 0.007), to MI (M = 0.94± 0.08) up to MP dilem-
mas (M = 1.44± 0.11). Post-hoc comparisons, in fact, showed
that NM dilemmas were different by both MI and MP ones
(p < 0.000001), as well as MI from MP dilemmas (p = 0.002).
A significant main effect for Gender was also shown
[F(1, 84) = 12.52; p = 0.0007], indicating that females produced
more out of context answers (M = 0.98± 0.07) than males
(M = 0.61± 0.08).
A significant interaction Condition × Perspective was also
found [F(2, 168) = 10.98; p = 0.00003]. MP dilemmas were asso-
ciated with an higher number of out of context counterfactual
thoughts than other dilemmas, and this effect was amplified in
the 1st person (actor) perspective, as shown in Figure 4 (post-hoc
p = 0.0001).
Finally, a significant Condition× Gender interaction has been
observed [F(2, 168) = 7.22; p = 0.0009], indicating that females
produced an higher number of out of context answers thanmales,
in particular for MI and MP dilemmas (0.0002 < p < 0.02) (see
Figure 5).
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FIGURE 4 | Condition × Perspective interaction on “Out of context”
responses. (NM, Non Moral; MI, Moral Impersonal; MP, Moral personal).
FIGURE 5 | Condition × Gender interaction on “Out of context”
responses. (NM, Non Moral; MI, Moral Impersonal; MP, Moral personal).
DISCUSSION
This study aimed at investigating the impact of selected variables
on counterfactual thinking in moral reasoning. For this purpose,
we used a modified version of Greene’s moral dilemmas test,
assessing both the time needed to provide a counterfactual and
the type of given response. Our results indicate an increase in
time needed to offer a counterfactual when individuals have to
cope with a MP dilemma. Such a slowing effect is amplified when
individuals have to deal with moral dilemmas presented in the
first person (i.e., actor). Moreover, looking at the type of answer,
an higher number of “out of context” responses was given when
individuals had to respond to moral personal dilemmas presented
in first person version. In the latter case, gender was a relevant
feature, since females showed a marked increase in this kind of
response.
The progressive increase in time of response from NM up to
MP dilemmas is in agreement with previous literature (Greene
et al., 2001). In fact, counterfactual thinking in the context
of moral reasoning depends both on cognitive and emotional
processes. Following Greene et al. (2001), an action is morally
right if it produces the highest utility of any available alterna-
tive action. The dual-process theory (Greene et al., 2001; Greene,
2009; McGuire et al., 2009) hypothesizes the presence of both
an affective system activated by moral personal judgments and
of a cognitive system preferentially activated by impersonal con-
flicts. Our finding may reflect a conflict between deontological
rules and cognitive control of problem solving. Counterfactual
thinking takes a longer time in the moral vs. non-moral con-
ditions because the involved emotional status is much stronger
and can intensify this conflict. Counterfactual thinking plays a
largely beneficial function for behavior regulation (Johnson and
Sherman, 1990), leading to performance improvement (Epstude
and Roese, 2008). Nevertheless, in a context of moral reason-
ing, conflict may explain the increase in response time revealed
in moral conditions.
Our study also showed a significant age-related difference. The
significant increase of response times observed in elderly sub-
jects may indicate a cognitive slowing (Deary et al., 2010; Eckert,
2011). This effect is significant both in contexts of moral and non-
moral judgment supporting the idea that it could be an specific
consequence of normal aging.
The present study also showed some differences with respect
to the type of response provided, with an increased number of
“out of context” responses in the moral dilemmas. This find-
ing reflects the tendency to use elements that are not directly
present in scenario, when a major conflict is present. This strat-
egy is aimed to have a broader choice for decision-making.
Furthermore, this tendency is greater in case of personal moral
dilemmas when presented in first person perspective. Our data
integrate those obtained in some previous studies (Elster, 1999;
Gilbert et al., 2004; Girotto et al., 2007), in which the role played
by the subject (actor or reader of the story) influenced considera-
tions and choices in counterfactual thinking. For example, Elster
(1999) argued that in the case of traumatic events, actors will
mentally modify external events rather than their own actions,
because they are motivated to avoid blame for their needs. Gilbert
et al. (2004) asked individuals who actually missed their train by
1min to reason counterfactually. These actors constructed exter-
nal counterfactuals more often than passengers who merely had
to imagine having missed their train. The authors’ interpretation
is that actors and readers had different motivational goals. There
is, however, another reason to suppose differences between actors’
and readers’ counterfactual thoughts: the differential availability
of salient information (Girotto et al., 2007). Here the authors con-
clude that actors and readers produce different counterfactuals
even because they rely on different information, independently
by motivations.
Another relevant aspect of moral dilemmas processing is
related to gender differences. We found that women provided
more out of context answers, “getting around” the conflict. More
specifically, women implicated as first person in moral dilem-
mas (MI and MP) provides a greater number of out of con-
text responses than men. This finding supports the idea that
women are less inclined to make utilitarian choices, trying to
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avoid putting others at risk of danger or harm (Gilligan, 1982).
Following this point of view, Gilligan hypothesized that women
could be mainly driven by emotions, empathy and care for oth-
ers, following the so-called ethics of care, while men could tend to
solve moral dilemmas following law and order rules, according to
an “ethics of justice.” It has also been suggested that these gender-
related differences could be connected to differences in empathic
ability (Baron-Cohen and Wheelwright, 2004; Eisenberg, 2005),
whichmake females more resistant to decisions that entail directly
inflicting physical or moral pain to other individuals, despite
their utilitarian value. The present findings are in line with data
proposed by Fumagalli et al. (2010a) suggesting that different
cognitive–emotional processes, possibly reflecting differences in
the underlying neural mechanisms, are involved in evaluatingMP
dilemmas in men and women. A functional neuroimaging study
(Harenski et al., 2008) investigated the neural correlates of moral
sensitivity in females and males, and found increased posterior
cingulate cortex and anterior insula activation in females, and an
enhanced inferior parietal cortex activation in males. A remark-
able gender-related difference has been found also in specific
neurotransmitter system, in particular in the frontal lobe neuro-
transmitters related to behavior (Kaasinen et al., 2001; Riccardi
et al., 2005). In addition, hormones greatly influence behavior
and their receptor distribution differs between sexes in the brain
structures involved in cognition (Kimura, 2002; Cahill, 2006).A
further demonstration that gender and its neuroanatomical bases
is a key feature in moral decision making, has been recently pro-
posed by Fumagalli et al. (2010b). By using transcranial direct
current stimulation (tDCS) applied to the ventral prefrontal cor-
tex (VPC), the authors found that the stimulation can interfere
with utilitarian decisions, influencing the evaluation of the advan-
tages and disadvantages of each option. While this effect is seen in
both sexes, it is stronger in females. The authors conclude that
gender-related tDCS-induced changes suggest that VPC differen-
tially controls utilitarian reasoning in females and in males.
The present study has several limitations. One is related to
the limited sample size. A higher number of participants could
have given the possibility to show other effects or interactions
between factors under investigation. The choice to apply a mul-
tiple comparison adjustment, however, can be considered as an
adequate protection from a type I error. Another possible limita-
tion is related to the choice of stressing counterfactual thinking,
by always proposing to the participants the worst scenario as the
predefined situation. Unfortunately, it was not possible to present
both the best and worst scenarios, in order to avoid a desensiti-
zation of participants to the moral questions. Presenting only the
best case (only 1 death instead of 5, as in the trolley dilemma)
could have induced in the participant a kind of “satisfaction” to
be in the best possible situation.
In conclusion, our study suggests that age, gender and per-
spective have a critical role in moral judgment and associated
counterfactual thinking. This finding may have implications for
the understanding of gender-related inclinations (i.e., specific job
choice, leadership and power management) as well as differences
in moral behavior (i.e., criminal behaviors). Future studies need
to be specifically designed to investigate the neuroanatomical
and neurophysiological differences of counterfactual thoughts in
moral decision-making, as well as the emotional consequences,
such as feelings of guilt, related to choices made in specific
conditions.
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